Introduction
Kosovo was the last territory of the former Yugoslavia to declare its independence (on 17 February 2008) and embark on the path to statehood and the creation of a separate citizenship regime. 1 The most urgent and demanding task in designing and running the 'newborn' polity was to determine the nature of the polity, internal organisation and institutional arrangements, legal and constitutional order, state boundaries, as well as the nature of citizenship. However, as is often the case, when the legitimacy of a political and territorial unit is disputed internally and externally, both the functioning of the state and the democratic consolidation of the political and citizenship regime are called into question. Consequently, other elements central to state building, such as the forging of an integrative ideology in a post-conflict society, are rendered problematic.
Following on from Krasniqi (2010a) , this paper focuses on the nascent citizenship regime in Kosovo since the country's declaration of independence. It argues that the defining characteristics of the Kosovan citizenship are: (i) adoption of the "new-state" model (Brubaker 1992, p. 277) i.e. inclusion into its citizenship of all Kosovo residents; (ii) tension between civic and multicultural conceptions of citizenship on the one side, and ethno-national conceptions on the other; and (iii) contested nature and overlapping jurisdictions. Moreover, the paper argues that the present legal, political and territorial dispute in Kosovo seriously undermines the consolidation of Kosovo's citizenship regime and has turned Kosovo into a territory of de facto shared sovereignties (condominium-like 'constellations').
2
As far as the adoption of the "new-state" model is concerned, it resulted both from Kosovo's peculiar path to statehood (compared to the rest of the new states in Yugoslavia) and from active international intervention in the process of state building. Unlike other territories of the former Yugoslavia that had republic-level citizenship regimes during the socialist era, Kosovo had to constitute its independent citizenry from the start. The "new-state" model chosen in
Kosovo -also known as the 'zero option' -where the initial body of citizens is constituted in a territorially inclusive fashion, in some ways reflects the vision of the international actors involved in the process, who wanted to utilize citizenship as a link between a war-torn community of people and a new polity based on principles of equality and inclusiveness. As will be discussed later in the text, based on the content of the constitution and basic statehood laws, as well as the character of its symbols and overall institutional design, Kosovo is at the same time a civic state 4 (with elements of individual liberalism and civic republicanism) of all its individual citizens (that are equal before the law) and a multi-ethnic state of different communities (Albanian, Serb, Turkish, Gorani, Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian).
But more than three years after its declaration of independence, Kosovo still does not possess all of a state's attributes, including external and internal sovereignty. This mainly stems from the issues related to Kosovo's contested international subjectivity (as of August 2011, only 81 Members of the United Nations have recognised Kosovo's independence), and the refusal of Serbs from northern Kosovo to be integrated in the political system of Kosovo. The latter issue has created a "stateness problem" (Linz and Stepan 1992, p. 200 ) -a situation in which a considerable number of people question the legitimacy of the new polity and its borders.
Kosovo's stateness problem, combined with the intrusive attitude of Serbia towards the former, has resulted in a condominium-like situation of overlapping Serb and Kosovan jurisdictions, at least in the northern part of Kosovo.
In terms of concepts and frameworks on citizenship, this paper will rely primarily on Christian Joppke's concept of citizenship that distinguishes between citizenship as status, as rights and as identity (2007), Brubaker's "new-state" model (1992) and his distinction between territorial/political and ethno-cultural conceptions of nationhood (1992a), and Rainer Bauböck's work on "citizenship constellations" (2010) as well as on condominium, transnational citizenship and political autonomy (2007) . These points are developed further in later sections.
This paper is divided into three main sections. The first section presents some limited background material on citizenship-related issues in Kosovo before 2008. The second section examines the emergence of the new Kosovan citizenship regime and distinguishes between three aspects of citizenship; status, rights and identity. The third section focuses on the issues of contested territory and statehood, and considers several possible scenarios for the future. from that issued by Serbia, issuing certificates of citizenship, and maintaining the electoral register , pp. 5-7, Rava 2010 . There is no doubt that in many aspects, this was a quasi-citizenship regime. The situation would, however, change drastically after 1989 6 when Kosovo's autonomy was forcibly abolished by Serbia, and further complicated after the dissolution of the SFRY.
State disintegrations, war, and international administration
In the aftermath of the dissolution of the SFRY, in 1992 the Republic of Serbia and the
Republic of Montenegro together established the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) with
Kosovo as an integral part of Serbia. In terms of citizenship, the FRY did not adopt a new law until 1996. In the meantime, the intensification of discriminatory practices aimed at ethnic Albanians in Kosovo resulted "in widespread involuntary migration". 3 The removal of citizenship from those who fled became an everyday practice in Kosovo and was condemned internationally (Weller 2009, p. 62) . In addition, new legislation was adopted to encourage Serb settlement in Kosovo (Weller 2009, p. 31; Rava 2010, pp. 9-10 Nonetheless, UNMIK created a separate civil register (Central Civil Register of Kosovo) for the residents of Kosovo, which in a way became a substitute for citizenship regulations, and issued UN Travel Documents to habitual residents in Kosovo (Krasniqi 2010, pp. 9-11 declared "to be a democratic, secular and multi-ethnic republic, guided by the principles of nondiscrimination and protection under the law." 6 Shortly thereafter, the Kosovan Assembly adopted a whole package of basic statehood laws, including the Law on Citizenship, 7 and started the process of replacing UNMIK documents (IDs and passports) with Kosovan ones, in this way setting up the contours of an independent citizenship regime, the first in the history of Kosovo.
Because of strong international participation during its creation as a state, Kosovo can be considered a "state of international design" (Bose 2005, p. 322) . This involved the application of a certain vision of state-building, which combined multicultural and civic elements, in a country where the number of minority groups does not exceed 10 per cent of the population.
Implementing such a vision, however, was going to be a big challenge because of ethnic tensions and divisions in post-war Kosovo on the one hand, and the desire of local leaders to have a state that reflects the wishes of the ethnic majority (Albanians) on the other. In Brubaker's (1992a, pp. x-xi) terms, this represents a tension between two different understandings of nationhood:
territorial and political (the French model), where nationhood is understood as political fact, and ethno-cultural (the German model), where nationhood is understood as an ethno-cultural fact.
Indeed, this tension is still very much present in Kosovo. In what follows I look at the Kosovan citizenship regime using Joppke's (2007, p. 38) concept of citizenship that distinguishes between at least three aspects of citizenship; status, rights and identity. The first aspect of citizenship denotes formal state membership and its associated criteria; the second aspect is both about 'classical' civic, political and social rights, as well as about the new generation of rights, namely multicultural recognition; the third aspect refers to the behavioural dimension of individuals at a time when membership in a state and identity often diverge (ibid). 8 Kosovo is not defined as a national state of its titular nation, but a multi-ethnic state of all citizens, guided by principles of non-discrimination and equal protection under the law of all communities. Constitutionally, Kosovo is defined as "a state of its citizens" (Article 1.2). Its citizens are tied to the new country based on a common citizenship, rather than on their national belonging or descent. Based on its legislation, Kosovo is, using Walzer's (1983, p. 41) typology, more of a 'French political club' than a 'German family home'. Certainly, citizenship aims at replacing divisions of ethnicity, religion or social status, therefore serving as a mechanism of ensuring equality before the law.
a) Citizenship as status: openness/restrictiveness
In the absence of a previous independent citizenship regime on which it could be based, Irrespective of the fact that it has a considerable diaspora, estimated at between 400,000 and 800,000 (Mustafa et al 2007 , Haxhikadrija 2009 citizens, politically every citizen is defined as a member of a community. The term community in this case refers to "inhabitants belonging to the same national or ethnic, linguistic, or religious group traditionally present on the territory of the Republic of Kosovo" (Article 57.1 of the Constitution). All the constitutionally recognised communities in Kosovo are granted specific group-rights, including reserved seats in the parliament (10 for the Serb community and 10 for the rest), at least two ministerial portfolios in the government, and proportional representation, as well as quotas, at other levels of governance. Moreover, the principle of double-majority is put in place for these pieces of legislation that are of 'vital interest' to minority communities. Indeed, such provisions of ethnic group rights present in the Kosovan legislation are similar to those found in Bosnia and Macedonia (Sarajlić 2010; Spaskovska 2010) , and in the main reflect the international community's 'multicultural vision' in shaping post-conflict societies in the Balkans.
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The new Kosovan Constitution on the one hand, by refusing to recognise exclusions, loyalties or claims of ancestral rights, defends the universalist values of civic republicanism and individual liberalism, but also speaks out for group rights (communities) and defends their exclusivity and group differentiated rights. Certainly, in the case of Kosovo we have deethnicisation of state institutions on the one hand, but on the other a multi-ethnic composition of the society reflected in politics i.e. ethnicisation of the political and social status of its citizens.
As a result, we have at the same time neutral civic state institutions, and yet the very functioning of the state is based on multi-ethnicity (the neutral state being there to ensure that no group will dominate or be discriminated against). Indeed, elements of multiculturalism and civic republicanism are melted together in the Kosovan legislation.
Citizenship, territory and minorities
In the case of Kosovo and its efforts to create an independent citizenship regime, territory is of exceptional political and geopolitical relevance. The Serb-Albanian dispute over the territory of Kosovo has been central to the conflict and continues to determine relations between the two groups in Kosovo, even in the context of citizenship and minority rights. In an attempt to respond to the post-war ethno-demographic segregation and creation of small Serbian-controlled areas in 
c) Citizenship as identity
There has been a huge level of external involvement in Kosovo since 1999. Its legal foundations are a product of attempts by Kosovo's sponsors and supervisors (the EU and the US) to decouple "notions of nationality and citizenship" (Allcock 1996, p. 74) and to reshape ethnic identities in the Balkans by way of institutional engineering. In this context, Kosovo is a "post-national state"
where state membership and identity are, using Joppke's (2007, p. 44) terminology, "structurally decoupled," with the state being unable to impose a certain identity on its citizens. Certainly, this affects other essential issues such as state cohesion, because a state that provides for liberalised citizenship and extensive minority rights often faces problems of unity and integration (ibid). In a situation where recognition of group rights seems to perpetuate group differences, the state of Kosovo lacks the necessary integrative ideology.
Returning to the issue of citizenship as identity, according to Joppke (2007, p. 44) , it encompasses both the views held by ordinary people and official views propagated by the state.
As far as ordinary people in Kosovo are concerned, they seem to be divided based on ethno- In summary, the ongoing state-building process in Kosovo is characterised by a tension between the ethno-cultural and political aspects of nationhood, statehood and citizenship.
Kosovo's Constitution and basic statehood laws have strong civic underpinnings (most notably manifested in the preamble of the constitution and the declaration of independence), but when it comes to various political rights, individuals can exercise them through their membership in a community (defined on ethnic basis). This tension is visible in the flag and symbols of the new state, designed also by the international community: the geographical shape of Kosovo suggests its territorial and civic nature and 6 stars above it, the equality of 6 constitutive communities (ethnic groups). Likewise, the lack of wider legitimacy of the new state's institutions, and of a higher sense of identification with the state (a form of 'we feeling'), which derive from the persistence of competing Serb-Albanian ethno-national loyalties, is detrimental to the new state's legitimacy.
Contested territory and statehood, overlapping jurisdictions
From the origin of the modern state, the idea of citizenship has been closely related to territory.
Membership of a polity meant access to a certain part of territory that belonged to a state. Thus, most theories assume that citizenship is "a relationship between individuals and political authorities inside an undifferentiated state territory" (Bauböck and Guiraudon 2009, p. 440 ). Yet in the age of plural membership and multi-level governance, individuals can be connected to a more complex web of legal and political rights beyond the borders of a single polity. Therein, Bauböck and Guiraudon argue that "territorial borders of states generally do not coincide with the boundaries of citizenship" (ibid.). This is determined by at least three factors: first, citizenship rights can be carried and exercised from abroad (external citizenship); second, states might be divided into different jurisdictions (ibid.); and third, the case of "unsettled states, disputed lands" (Lustick 1993 ).
In the case of Kosovo, due to the complex and unique interplay of all these three factors, the borders of the polity do not coincide with the boundaries of citizenship. As regards the issue of external citizenship -understood as "a generic concept that refers to the status, rights and duties of all those who are temporarily or permanently outside the territory of a polity that recognizes them as members" (Bauböck 2009, p. 478 ) -by allowing dual and multiple citizenship, Kosovo thus includes in its citizenry many citizens with long term residence abroad.
In addition, it also includes other people who at the same time hold citizenship of another state in the region (Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia etc). On the other hand, when it comes to the issue of the subdivisions within the territory, according to the Ahtisaari Plan and the Kosovan Constitution, Kosovo is a unitary state, although with a decentralised structure of local selfgovernment that in practice means the creation of territories with strong ethnic majorities.
At present, Kosovo remains both a contested territory and an unsettled state. Its statehood is contested both internally and externally. As regards the international aspect, Serbia, Russia, Consequently, Kosovo's sovereignty is limited in some areas of the country, especially in northern Kosovo, which is de facto under the control of Serbia. 13 The end result is a situation of (informal) overlapping sovereignties and jurisdictions. As far as the issue of sovereignty is concerned, the challenge to Kosovo's assertion of sovereignty is twofold. First, Serbia still treats 
Disentangling Kosovan citizenship: heading towards a form of condominium?
Ultimately, citizenship is about membership in a political community. This is an essential precondition for individual autonomy and well-being (Bauböck 2009, p. 478) . Although it is widely recognised that everyone should be entitled to the right of membership in a political community, according to Bauböck (2009) , "we need to know which communities have a claim to self-government and which individuals have a claim to citizenship in a particular self-governing community" (p. 478). Undoubtedly, the first question lies at the heart of the ongoing political, legal and territorial dispute in the case of Kosovo. As I have shown, various obstacles, mostly related to the issue of Kosovo's challenged legal and international status, hinder the significant progress made in the context of consolidation of Kosovo's independent citizenship regime.
Hence, the overall progress in the process of state-building in Kosovo is inherently linked to the consolidation and functionality of the citizenship regime. To sum up the argument, Kosovo's nascent citizenship regime represents the seventh independent citizenship regime to emerge (so far) in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. It differs from the others in that it represents a 'new-state' ('zero option') model resulting from a process of institutional and constitutional engineering led by international actors. In the context of the nature of the polity, due to the presence of elements of both civic republicanism and multiculturalism, Kosovo can be defined as a state with institutionalised multi-ethnicity hidden behind a mantel of civicness. However, notwithstanding its 'Europeanised' institutional and legal infrastructure, at present, Kosovo remains a disputed territory, where Serb and Kosovan jurisdictions and sovereignties overlap, most notably in the northern part of Kosovo. These blurred boundaries and overlapping jurisdictions make both Serbia and Kosovo unfinished and unconsolidated states with no clear territorial boundaries. Certainly, this context is not the most favourable one in which a new citizenship regime can be born in and mature.
